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Abstract
Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally
predict that while individual eﬀort may increase as competition intensiﬁes
between workers, the incentive for workers to cooperate with each other di-
minishes. We report on a ﬁeld experiment conducted with workers from a
ﬁshing community in Toyama Bay, Japan. Our participants are employed
in three diﬀerent aspects of ﬁshing. The ﬁrst group are ﬁshermen, the sec-
ond group are ﬁsh wholesalers (or traders), and the third group are staﬀ
at the local ﬁshing coop. Although our participants have much in com-
mon (e.g., their common relationship to the local ﬁshery and the fact that
they all live in the same community), we argue that they are exposed to
diﬀerent amounts of competition on-the-job and that these diﬀerences ex-
plain diﬀerences in cooperation in our experiment. Speciﬁcally, ﬁshermen
and traders, who interact in more competitive environments are signiﬁ-
cantly less cooperative than the coop staﬀ who face little competition on
the job. Further, after accounting for the possibility of personality-based
selection, perceptions of competition faced on-the-job and the treatment
eﬀect of job incentives explain these diﬀerences in cooperation to a large
extent.
Keywords: Field experiment, cooperation, social disapproval, social pref-
erence, competition, Japan, ﬁshing
JEL codes: C90, C93, H41, M54, Z13
1 Introduction
Most jobs require workers to perform a menu of tasks including individual and
cooperative tasks. Individual tasks increase individual productivity while co-
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1operative tasks improve the productivity of workers as a whole. In some cases
these tasks are complementary so that team production might be required for
anything to be produced. In other cases eﬀort exerted to perform the two tasks
is substitutable and productivity-enhancing cooperation might be as simple as
one worker sacriﬁcing her own performance to help another. However, as per-
sonnel economics has pointed out, the ability of a ﬁrm to take advantage of
strategic complementarities embodied in the production process depends to a
great extent on the choice of compensation scheme. For example, Lazear (1989),
Prendergast (1999) and Rob and Zemsky (2002) point out that workers who face
tournament incentives for promotion, or competition from other workers in gen-
eral, will be less inclined to cooperate. In fact, workplace competition often
provides an incentive to sabotage the eﬀorts of others (Chen, 2003). Recogniz-
ing this problem, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) suggest using low powered
incentives on the individual tasks to balance the incentives between competing
tasks. At the same time, Rotemberg (1994) moving in the opposite direction,
shows that strategic complementarities as arise under team production, for ex-
ample, provide a necessary condition for altruism to evolve among co-workers.
He further suggests that such between-worker altruism can increase productiv-
ity.
Despite the interesting balance of incentives provided by introducing compe-
tition in the workplace — on one hand individual workers may exert more eﬀort
to win promotion or make more money while on the other overall production
might suﬀer because of the lack of cooperation among workers — there has been
remarkably little empirical work estimating the eﬀect of competition on work-
place cooperation. One obvious reason is that it is hard to measure cooperation
between workers. This is why ﬁeld experimental measures of social preference
are potentially useful. The one noteworthy non-experimental study is Drago
and Garvey (1998) who show that Australian workers tend to share tools and
equipment less often when compensation is allocated more competitively.
There has also been little work on the relationship between compensation
schemes and the extent to which workplace social preferences arise. One excep-
tion is Burks et al. (2005) who ﬁnd that the distribution of cooperative social
preferences among bicycle messengers can be predicted by whether riders are
paid on commission or not. Consistent with Rotemberg (1994), those messen-
gers who are paid on commission were 12% more likely to be classiﬁed as egoists
in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma experiment than those who are paid hourly
or are members of coops that share revenues. Further, controlling for selection
into jobs, performance pay couriers were still 11% more likely to be classiﬁed as
an egoist. We contribute to this thin literature by using a ﬁeld experiment to
measure social preferences for cooperation among workers who experience dif-
fering degrees of strategic complentarity and face varying degrees of on-the-job
competition.1
1We have recently also been made aware of the complementary study by Bandiera et al.,
(2004) who examine the eﬀect of relative (versus piece rate) incentives on productivity and
cooperation. In their study cooperation is measured as the diﬀerence in observed eﬀort from
the Pareto optimal eﬀort level. They ﬁnd that cooperation depends on work group size, work
2Our workers are all engaged in ﬁshing in Toyama Bay which opens from the
Honsyu main island into the Sea of Japan. This means that by design we control
for any diﬀerences in regional cultural norms or industrial practices by limiting
our attention to one ﬁshery, but our participants engage in one of three diﬀerent
tasks. One group ﬁshes for various species in teams of four or ﬁve, another group
runs the coop where all the ﬁsh are auctioned to the third group of traders who
wholesale the ﬁsh to retail outlets as far away as Tokyo and Osaka. While our
experiment covers workers employed in three diﬀerent activities, we actually
have four distinct groups who face diﬀering levels of on-the-job competition.
One subgroup of the ﬁshermen, comprising approximately half the group, ﬁsh
competitively, each boat catching and selling its ﬁsh independently of the others.
In contrast, the other half of the ﬁshermen have formed a collective in which
revenues and many expenses are pooled across boats. This also implies that
according to Rotemberg (1994) our pooling ﬁshermen, who face a second degree
of strategic complementarity, should feel added pressure to be other-regarding
compared to the nonpoolers.
The comparison of poolers to nonpoolers provides a clean test of the Rotem-
berg (1994) conjecture because most of the elements of the production process
are common except those elements related to the fact that the poolers share rev-
enues (and many operating costs). Additionally, the strategic complemantarities
between pooling boats are clear. At the same time, variation in competition on-
the-job provides a broader link between all our participants. For this reason we
consider analyzing the eﬀect of competition our primary goal and testing the
Rotemberg hypothesis our secondary goal.
Considering our primary goal, clearly the pooling arrangement will reduce
competition within the subgroup of poolers because it dramatically compresses
the distribution of compensation (Lazear, 1989). By comparison, members of
the nonpooling subgroup face competition from both the other subgroup and
the other boats in their subgroup. Likewise, traders face intense competition
on the job from the other traders. In fact, the encounter among nonpoolers
has been analyzed using a modiﬁed Cournot model (Seki, forthcoming) while
the interaction between the traders might be conceptualized in a Betrand price
competition model. Coop staﬀ, on the other hand, face little competition be-
cause the organizational structure of the coop is relatively ﬂat and there are few
incentives or opportunities to outdo other staﬀ members.
Based on the material incentives associated with their jobs, we categorize
our participants along a competition continuum: traders and nonpoolers face
high levels of on-the-job competition, poolers face medium levels, and coop staﬀ
face low levels. As we will see, this classiﬁcation is conﬁrmed to some degree by
survey responses that we also collected from our participants. In addition, we
ﬁnd that cooperation levels in our artefactual ﬁeld public goods game correlate
with our assertions about the competitiveness of the workplace.2 Comparing
group heterogeneity, and the ability to engage in peer monitoring.
2We classify our ﬁeld experiment as artefactual because our subject pool is nonstandard,
but the experiment was conducted in a improvised lab setting. See Harrison and List (2004)
or Carpenter et al. (2005) for more on the classiﬁcation of ﬁeld experiments.
3contribution levels from games played within groups we ﬁnd that, non-pooling
ﬁshermen cooperate the least with each other, traders and poolers are slightly
more cooperative, but staﬀ members cooperate the most. With respect to the
Rotemberg (1994) idea that strategic complementarity should correlate with
the evolution of social preferences on-the-job, we do ﬁnd that poolers are more
cooperative than non-poolers, however the diﬀerence in point estimates never
rises to the level of signiﬁcance especially when one accounts for demographic
eﬀects and the impact of workplace competition.
Most importantly, however, when we directly link cooperation to our sur-
veyed measures of on-the-job competition we ﬁnd that higher levels of perceived
competition are associated with lower levels of cooperation in the experiment
and the inclusion of this regressor absorbs some of the variation in cooperation
previously attributed to indicator variables marking the groups. In other words,
we have evidence that part of the reason we see diﬀerences in cooperation by job
category is because workers feel more competitive towards each other in some
jobs.
We proceed by ﬁrst providing more of the institutional details of ﬁshing in
Toyama Bay. We then describe our ﬁeld protocol and present general results
from the experiment. In the ﬁfth section we bolster our general ﬁnding by
more explicitly linking workplace competition to cooperation in our experiment
which in Carpenter and Seki (2004) we show correlates with cooperation and
productivity on the job, at least for the ﬁshermen. Before concluding, we oﬀer
some evidence of a treatment eﬀect of exposure to diﬀerent jobs on worker social
preferences.
2 Fishing in Toyama Bay
Toyama Bay which opens into the Sea of Japan from the west coast of the
Honsyu main island of Japan, is known for a large variety of highly valued ﬁsh
species because of the complex structure of the sea bottom and a mixture of
currents that ﬂow into the bay. There are 16 small ﬁshing communities situated
along the coast including our base, Shinminato. Japanese ﬁsherfolk organize
themselves into local Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCAs) that formed
in the wake of traditional ﬁshermen guilds at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury (Yamamoto and Short, 1991). FCAs control ﬁsh auctions, provide ﬁshing
materials (e.g., fuel, ice, and packing materials), manage saving accounts for
the members, organize regular meetings and training for the member ﬁsher-
men, along with regulating the local ﬁsheries. FCAs organize auctions to sell
the day’s haul to registered merchants, retailers, and processors. These auc-
tions are considered one of the most important functions of the FCAs, not only
because they generate more revenues for the ﬁsherfolk by extracting resource
rents, but also because they act as a venue for ﬁsherfolk discussions (Hasegawa
et al., 1991). Sales revenues, net of commissions to the FCAs, are transferred
into the savings accounts of the individual member ﬁshermen. Over 500 ﬁshers
belong to the Shiminato FCA which employs 14 full-time staﬀ members (three
4females and 11 males). Most male staﬀ members are directly involved in ﬁsh
auctions, while female staﬀ members are responsible for processing daily sales
information and managing the ﬁnancial accounts of the members. Other tasks,
including the daily cleaning of the auction premises and the FCA building, are
shared among all the staﬀ members.
With regard to ﬁshery regulations, local FCAs do not only implement and
enforce national and prefectural legislation, they also devise complementary
regulations that are designed speciﬁcally to deal with evolving local conditions.
Within each FCA, ﬁshermen are grouped according to the species they target
and/or the ﬁshing technologies that they use. The ﬁshermen that participated
in our study belong to the small-scale trawlers group. All 12 boats belong to
the group specializing in ﬁshing Shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp) between April
and October, and crabs and cold-water shrimp (Akaebi) during the rest of the
year.
What is important to reiterate is that during the Shiroebi season, the 12
boats are organized into two groups based on whether or not they pool their
catch. One group, consisting of seven boats and 30 ﬁshermen (7 skippers, 21
crew members, and 2 onshore helpers) whom we call poolers, have shared both
income and operating expenses since the beginning of the 1960s.3 The second
group, which we call the nonpoolers, consists of 5 ﬁshing boats and 30 ﬁshermen
(5 skippers and 25 crewmen). Members of this second group do not pool income
or expenses.
Each Shrioebi ﬁshing boat is staﬀed with one skipper and three or four
crewmembers. The skippers (often the boat owners) navigate the boat and
supervise the operation of all the ﬁshing equipment (e.g., echo sounder, satellite
navigation, ﬁshing nets), and make all ﬁnal decisions concerning the operation.
Although ﬁshing operations are highly mechanised, the experience of the skipper
and coordination among the crew members are believed to be important for
better performance. For instance, in addition to the use of an echo sounder
and global positioning system to detect and locate concentrations of shrimp,
knowledge of the bay’s seabed topography increases the accuracy of a search and
prevents the costly loss of nets. Many aspects of handling the ﬁshing equipment
are done manually and require coordination among the crewmembers. Given
the large size of the nets (approximately 200 meters by 100 meters), setting and
lifting a net requires coordinated maneuvering by two or more crew members.
Additionally, handling the stock post-harvest requires quick and coordinated
action to maintain freshness and quality.
As a matter of tradition, the division of income between the owner and
crewmembers is almost identical across all boats (poolersand nonpoolers). Total
income is divided into 71
2 shares of which 31
2 shares accrue to the boat owner
and 4 shares are divided equally among a skipper and crewmembers. Among
the poolers there are two retired skippers and another crewmember who handle
the ﬁsh on-shore. They are responsible for oﬄoading and weighing the shrimp.
3More speciﬁcally, poolers share both income and operating expenses, but in terms of cap-
ital investments, only costs of nets are borne by the whole group; boats and other equipment
are individually ﬁnanced.
5These on-shore helpers receive the same income as the other crewmembers. As
for the nonpooling group, these on-shore tasks are carried out by the wives of the
skippers and their shares are accounted for in the owners’ share. The wives of
the nonpooling skippers are therefore considered nonpoolers in our experiment.
Cooperative staﬀ members are remunerated according to a ﬁxed wage system
akin to the public sector. Their wages rise with seniority and they are given a
relatively generous pension beneﬁt.
There are approximatley 22 ﬁsh traders who participate in daily auctions
held at the Sinminato FCA. Most of them, except a few employees of a super-
market chain, are descendants of traditional local ﬁsh merchant families. All
traders are involved in ﬁsh processing as well as wholesaling or retailing, and
many of them also participate in auctions held at other FCAs along Toyama
Bay. Shiminato ﬁsh traders are known for their competitive business practices.4
3 Field Experimental Design
Because we are interested in diﬀerences in on-the-job levels of cooperation, we
employed a standard social dilemma experiment, the voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM), which elicits contributions to a public good. Each of the
eight sessions was run within one of the populations we sampled so that we
gathered measures of cooperation among people who naturally interact with
each other at work. In addition to running sessions of all nonpoolers, all poolers,
all traders, and all staﬀ, we also ran two sessions with college students from
Toyama prefecture to link our results to the standard laboratory literature and
demonstrate that our ﬁeld results are not an artifact of our procedures.
While the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of our ten-round VCM use a standard proto-
col, the second ﬁve rounds employ an innovation ﬁrst used in Carpenter et al.
(2004a) and Carpenter et al. (2004b).5 In these ﬁve rounds, participants are
allowed to show social disapproval for the contribution levels of the group. So-
cial disapproval is a costly signal sent by individual players anonymously to
show that they are unhappy with how much the group contributed on the last
round. In practice, the signal was a number of unhappy faces displayed for the
group at the beginning of rounds 7-10 that illustrated the number of dissatisﬁed
group members. We included this design feature as an auxiliary test of whether
on-the-job competition predicted rates of norm enforcement among groups of
co-workers.
The details of the strategic environment are as follows.6 Participants inter-
acted anonymously (the experiment was single-blind) in non-changing groups
of four. Each participant started each round with an endowment of ten 50-yen
4There are a number of anecdotal stories that suggest a competitive work environment
among the Shinminato traders. For instance, one of the traders invented a viable system to
shell and freeze shiroebi allowing him to supply the lucrative urban markets. While he did not
share this information, his competitors gradually found out. Even now, the trader workshops
and storage facilities are kept covered so that their work cannot been observed by the others.
5However, the protocol resembles Masclet et al. (2003).
6See the appendix for the instructions.
6coins (approximately $4.30 at the time). We used real money and high stakes
to make the decision as salient as possible. The marginal per capita return on
the public good was 0.5 so free riding was the dominant strategy. Free riding
remained the dominant strategy during the social disapproval rounds because
it cost 10 yen to display an unhappy face. This cost assured unhappy faces
would not be a component of any subgame perfect strategy (i.e., social dis-
approval is just a second-order public good). More importantly however, the
unhappy faces carried no monetary implications for the other group members
a n dt h e r e f o r et h e yd i dn o tp r o v i d ef r e er i d e r sw i t ha ni n c e n t i v et oc o o p e r a t e .
At the beginning of each round, participants (sitting behind ﬁeld-improvised
blinds to provide privacy) were given small envelopes with ten 50-yen coins in-
side. Participants then took out as many coins as they wanted to keep for
themselves and put them in another larger opaque envelope. Once everyone
had made this decision, an experimenter came around to collect the contribu-
tions in the smaller envelopes. Group total contributions were then calculated
and reported to the participants on sheets of paper that listed individual con-
tributions (in random order), the group total contribution, and the payoﬀ from
the public good. During the social disapproval rounds, participants were given
additional slips of paper at the feedback stage on which they indicated whether
they wanted to pay 10 yen to show disapproval or not. If any unhappy face
signals were purchased within a group, they were stamped on the endowment
envelopes at the beginning of the next round. Hence, at the beginning of rounds
7-10 participants saw between 0 and 4 unhappy faces on their endowment en-
velopes. After the experiment was completed, participants ﬁlled out a survey
that included demographics, a few standard personality questions, and questions
about their work.
We summarize the characteristics of our participants in Table 1. Overall, we
had 77 participants: 26 were students, 13 were nonpoolers, 14 were poolers, 12
were traders, and the remaining 12 were coop staﬀ members.7 The number of
women participants varies by population. At one extreme there were no women
pooling ﬁshermen, but there were a few women who work for the nonpooling
boats. The ﬁsherfolk tend to be older than the traders and coop staﬀ and the
latter two groups tend to be in their mid-thirties. High (or Occupational) School
is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if high school is the partic-
ipant’s highest level of educational attainment. While there is some variation
among the workers, approximately half stopped after high school (many of the
rest left earlier).
We also had participants respond to two personality scales: a version of
the Rotter (1966) questionnaire which is thought to measure the internal ver-
sus external orientation of participants and a four-question cooperation scale.
Internally oriented participants tend to believe that they are largely respon-
7Notice that the participant numbers by population are not all evenly divided by four.
In the few cases where we could not get full groups of four we relied on the fact that the
participants did not know what group they were in and formed “shadow members.” These
randomly chosen participants contributed to their own group but their behavior was counted
in another group to get the total up to four persons.
7sible for their own fates while externals believe that life tends to “happen to
them.” For example, internals believe, "my success depends on ability rather
than luck" while externals think people are successful because they are lucky.
In our implementation, participants stated whether they agreed or disagreed
with six statements and their Rotter score was simply the sum of these re-
sponses. Responses that indicated internal orientation were coded as +1 and
those indicating external orientation were coded as -1. As one can see the pool-
ers and to a lesser degree, staﬀ members tended to be more internally oriented
while the non-poolers and traders tended to be externally oriented.
The cooperation scale asked whether participants agreed, disagreed, or had
no reaction to the following four statements: 1) It is virtuous to compete; 2)
It is virtuous to cooperate; 3) One must reciprocate kindness; 4) People should
revenge wrongs done to them. One’s score increased by one for agreeing with 2
and 3 and for disagreeing with 1 and 4. One’s score decreased by one for agreeing
w i t h1a n d4a n dd i s a g r e e i n gw i t h2a n d3 .B a s e do nt h el a s tr o wo fT a b l e1 ,
we see that the poolers had the most cooperative dispositions followed by the
nonpoolers. In fact, poolers are signiﬁcantly more cooperative than students,
staﬀ, and traders based on this scale, however, none of the other diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
4 General Experimental Results
Overall, pooling the ten rounds of data, our participants contributed an average
of 4.64 coins (out of a 10 coin endowment). When we split the data by sampled
population we ﬁnd interesting diﬀerences in the central tendencies of the con-
tribution data. Students contribute by far the least, 3.15 coins, on average, and
the worker population means can be ordered as follows: nonpoolers (4.59) <
poolers (5.14) < traders (5.56) < staﬀ (6.46).8 The Mann-Whitney Rank Sum
test indicates that each link in this ordering is signiﬁcant at the 5% level or bet-
ter except the pooler-trader diﬀerence. To get a better sense of the distribution
of contribution decisions, Figure 1 presents an overall histogram of contributions
pooled over the ten rounds and individual histograms from each sample. As one
can see there are interesting diﬀerences in the distributions. For example, the
students are more likely to contribute nothing than any of the other groups and
the norm of contributing half only arises among the ﬁsherfolk.9
Because pooled histograms mask any dynamics in contribution choices, in
Figure 2 we present average contributions by round for each of our samples.
There are a number of interesting dimensions to these graphs. First while the
students, nonpoolers and traders show signiﬁcant end game eﬀects (i.e., contri-
butions drop dramatically in the last few rounds), poolers and staﬀ members do
8Our student contribution rates seem comparable but slightly lower than those reported
in Yamagishi (1986) or Kiyonari et al. (2000).
9Despite the students being more likely to contribute nothing, if we look at average positive
contributions (i.e., we drop the zeros) the ordering remains the same: Stu(4.26) < NP(4.78)
< P(5.5) < T(6.23) < Sta(6.51).
8not. In fact, the poolers show increasing contributions once social disapproval is
allowed and the staﬀ levels of cooperation increase throughout the experiment.
Another more subtle diﬀerence in the graphs appears when one focuses on the
regime change between rounds 5 and 6. After social disapproval is initiated,
contributions in each sample except the nonpoolers increase at least for a short
while.
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test does not account for the fact that
our experiment generates a panel of contribution data. To account for individual
heterogeneity we regress contribution choices on sample indicators and include
individual level random eﬀects. On top of this we also include round ﬁxed eﬀects
to account for any shared time trends in the data. The results are reported in
column (1) of Table 2.10 Each group of workers contributes signiﬁcantly more
than our baseline — the students. Further, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are
roughly in line with our expectations, given the amount of on-the-job competi-
tion faced by the workers in each group. On average, nonpoolers contribute just
2.06 coins more than students, traders contribute 2.99 more, poolers contribute
2.45 more, and staﬀ members contribute 4.02 more. Given the average student
contribution is 3.15 coins, it appears that staﬀ members are more than twice as
cooperative with each other as students are.11 Using χ2 tests we can examine
the degree to which the point estimates are diﬀerent and how well our contribu-
tions data line up with our expectations based on competitiveness of each job.
At the 5% level, the nonpooler-staﬀ and pooler-staﬀ coeﬃcients are diﬀerent so
there is some additional support for the expected ordering.
Another advantage of running regressions with our contribution data is that
we can add control variables which, at a minimum, should help counteract
any possible non-random assignment to population. For example, while we
are happy, as a ﬁrst step, to discover diﬀerences in cooperative behavior that
correspond to diﬀerences in on-the-job competition, it may be hard to say much
about the mechanism underlying the diﬀerences. On one hand, it could be that
competition on the job aﬀects social preferences for cooperation (as seen in the
lab in Carpenter, 2005), but an equally plausible explanation is that competitive
people select into more competitive environments.
While selection could be a factor, there are historical and institutional rea-
sons why we think it is not a strong force in our results. Among the ﬁshermen,
there is a rich narative that we detail in Carpenter and Seki (2004) of how there
came to be two groups of ﬁshermen. The “upshot,” however, is that the poolers
and their ancestors have been ﬁshing for shiroebi since the 18th century. Pooling
(for the poolers) came about in the 1960s initially as a best response to income
ﬂuctuations and externalities inﬂicted on each other such as damaging each oth-
10One can also see that the individual random eﬀects account for 21% (p<0.01) of the
variation in contributions (i.e., rho=0.21).
11We concede that restricting "like types" to play with each other may exaggerate the
diﬀerences in contributions. However, these sorts of peer eﬀects are naturally occurring and
part of what we are trying to capture in our experiment. It would be interesting to compare
these data with data from experiments in which participants were randomly assigned (across
job types) into groups to measure cooperation with other workers. However, this is not the
focus of the current study.
9ers nets and the ineﬃcient use of the ﬁshing grounds (Platteau and Seki, 2001).
In particular, the pooling arrangement enabled the ﬁshermen to maximise their
surplus by price discriminating among the buyers (Seki, forthcoming). In sum,
there are many reasons to consider pooling as an economic choice of all the
people ﬁshing in the 1960s for this shrimp, rather than some process of diﬀeren-
tial selection into (or away from) pooling by some due to their competitiveness.
Put diﬀerently, pooling was originally needed because the ﬁshermen were not a
priori cooperative enough to overcome various coordination problems.
The nonpoolers originally ﬁshed for a diﬀerent shrimp species that became
less economically lucrative in the early 1990s. After 6 years of negotiations, the
nonpoolers were allowed to ﬁsh for shiroebi with the poolers. This resulted in the
end of the pooler monopoly for shiroebi in 1992 but the pooling arrangement did
not fall apart. Part of the reason why the pooling arrangement has been stable
is that most skippers simply adopt whatever compensation scheme their fathers
used. This implies that unless personality (i.e., competitiveness in particular)
is completely inherited from one’s father (who as we already suggested adopted
pooling for economic not personality reasons), we should also not see sorting of
new ﬁshermen into jobs based on personal competitiveness. In fact, most traders
and some of the coop staﬀ members also hold their jobs because of traditional
family ties.
To further assuage the reader, in column (2) of Table 2 we add an indicator
for whether social disapproval was allowed, a female indicator, age and age2
(a la List, 2004), whether the participant’s highest level of education was high
school, the participant’s Rotter score and the cooperation scale. The last two
regressors in particular wereadded to partially control for diﬀerences in attitudes
towards competition and cooperation that might be stable personality factors
causing workers to chose one job over another. In this speciﬁcation none of the
demographics gain traction. However, in the speciﬁcation in column (3) which
we retrun to in some detail in section 5, we see that contributions are concave
in age which is similar to what Carpenter et al. (2004a) found in Vietnam
but the opposite of what List (2004) found in the United States and both the
Rotter score and the cooperation scale are signiﬁcant. Internals appear to be
less cooperative (p<0.05), and those who score higher on the cooperation scale
do contribute signiﬁcantly more (p<0.05).
Before moving on, we brieﬂy examine the social disapproval data. Figure
3 presents time series of the average predicted probability that an individual
will show social disapproval, controlling for the contributions of the other group
members.12 One might expect the disapproval rates to be high for the students
because their contributions are so low. However, notice that the graphs in Figure
3 control for how much the other group members contribute so it appears that
students use the disapproval mechanism more in general. While Figure 3 reveals
interesting diﬀerences in the use of social disapproval (e.g., traders and poolers
barely use it at all while nonpoolers and staﬀ members do), the levels do not
12Speciﬁcally, the values plotted in Figure 3 are the average predicted values by population
from the following probit regression: Pr[Di,t =1 |C−i,t]=α+β(C −i,t)+ i,t where Di,t is a
disapproval indicator and C−i,t is the total contribution by the other members of the group.
10seem to map as well onto diﬀerences in on-the-job competition.
In Table 3 we report the results of random eﬀect probit regressions to assess
diﬀerences in the likelihood of disapproval by population. In the uncontrolled
regression (1) we see that each coin contributed by the other group members
reduces the likelihood that another group member will show disapproval by a
modest 3% (n.s.) and that traders and poolers use disapproval signiﬁcantly less
than students. Comparing the point estimates in column (1) we ﬁnd that pool-
ers and traders disapprove signiﬁcantly less than staﬀ members (p<0.05 and
p<0.10, respectively). In column (2) we add the controls and ﬁnd that these
changes dramatically increase the marginal eﬀects associated with nonpoolers,
poolers, and traders. Now all workers, with the exception of staﬀ members, dis-
approve signiﬁcantly less than students, controlling for how much their group
contributed. As with the contribution data, the demographics contribute lit-
tle to the analysis. The one exception is that we ﬁnd that older participants
robustly show disapproval more often.
In sum, our experiment reveals interesting diﬀerences in behavior between
students and workers and between workers. While the disapproval results are
interesting, the focus of the paper is on the contribution data because this is
where personnel economics provides crisp predictions. In line with our expec-
tations, we ﬁnd that those jobs that foster more competition between workers
are associated with lower levels of cooperation. At the same time, we ﬁnd lit-
tle support for the Rotemberg (1994) hypothesis that workers engaged in team
production will act more altruistically towards each other. In the next two sec-
tions we extend these basic results by discussing the importance of self-reports
of competition on the job and the treatment eﬀect of workplace incentives.
5 Competitive environments and worker coop-
eration
At this point our evidence for the eﬀect of competition on the cooperativeness
of workers is circumstantial. We have shown that contribution levels in our
ﬁeld experiment are ordered as we would expect given the levels of on-the-
job competition that are inherent in ﬁshing, trading and being a staﬀ member.
However, we still do not have a direct link between competition and cooperation.
Indeed, what might really be important is the amount of perceived competition
felt by our participants not the incentives they face. To build a more convincing
case we conclude by oﬀering direct evidence in the form of surveyed attitudes
of the participants towards each other. Speciﬁcally, in our post-experiment
survey we asked our participants to respond (in the ﬁsherfolks case) to the
following statement, “I consider my fellow ﬁshers:” with their choice of: (1) as
family members, (2) as friends, (3) as strangers, and (4) as competitors. Each
sample responded to an appropriately worded statement and the distribution of
responses by sample are collected in Table 4. Because some of the participants
checked more than one response, the frequencies in Table 4 do not all add up
11to one.
Considering just the workers, it is interesting that the nonpoolers, who we
consider to face a lot of competition on the job, consider none of the other
ﬁsherfolk as family and 69% of them consider the other ﬁsherfolk as competitors.
Similarly, the traders consider none of the other traders as family and 42%
of them consider the other traders as competitors. By contrast 21% of the
poolers consider the other ﬁsherfolk as family and only 14% see the others as
competitors. At ﬁrst glance the coop staﬀ seem to break the correlation between
workplace incentives and perceptions of on-the-job competition because 42% of
them consider the other staﬀ members to be competitors, but another 42%
consider the other staﬀ members to be like family. This suggests that the staﬀ
members perceive a sort of friendly or healthy competition compared to the
more intense competition felt by the traders and the nonpoolers, in particular.
Overall, the perceptions of competition seem to line up rather well with the
incentives implicit in the diﬀerent jobs.
To construct a measure of perceptions of competition on-the-job we created
an indicator variable called competitive work environment which simply takes
a value of zero if a participant considered his fellow workers as either family or
friends and a value of one otherwise. This allows us to separate the friendly
staﬀ competition from the intense competitive feelings of the nonpoolers and
traders.13 Returning to Table 2, we see our main result. Adding the com-
petitive work environment indicator in column (3) reveals a highly signiﬁcant
association: participants who perceive their work environment to be competi-
tive contribute signiﬁcantly fewer coins, 1.53 fewer, on average. Further, adding
the competitive work environment indicator compresses the diﬀerence in the
point estimates for the diﬀerent jobs which suggests that part of the variation
in contributions previously associated with diﬀerences in jobs are actually due
to diﬀerences in levels of perceived on-the-job competition associated with the
diﬀerent jobs.14 To make the latter point more forcefully, Table 5 summarizes
χ2 tests for diﬀerences in the job category indicator variables for columns (2)
and (3) of Table 2. In other words, if controlling for perceptions of on-the-job
competition does partially explain why we see diﬀerences in contribution rates
by job, then the second χ2 statistics that come from column (3) should be lower
than the ﬁrst ones from column (2) because the diﬀerence in the point estimates
13Adding three of the four indicator variables does not perform quite as well as using the
competitive work environment indicator, but we are convinced this is because the competitor
indicator can not discern the qualitative diﬀerence between the staﬀ response and the response
of the other participants.
14One potential problem with column (3) of Table 2 (or columns (3) and (4) of Table 3)
is that cooperation and competitive attitudes could be endogenous. In unreported regres-
sions, we tried to instrument competitive attitudes but none of the instruments we tried were
particularly strong. Instrumenting for competitive attitudes, however, will be hard in any
case because it will always be diﬃcult to satisfy the exclusion restrictions given we still know
remarkably little about what determines play in the VCM. Based on Ledyard (1995) we tried
to use a participant’s sex because the evidence on whether there are sex-diﬀerences in contri-
butions is not robust. However this instrument is weak (the raw correlation between Female
and Competitive Work Environment is -0.01) as was another more defensible instrument, the
number of actual “competitors” our participants faced on-the-job.
12will fall. Indeed, in each case, except the pooler-trader diﬀerence, the second χ2
is lower and in three cases the reduction in the diﬀerence is enough to remove
or lower the signiﬁcance of the statistic.
Although social disapproval is not the focus of the paper, we report the
same analysis using columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 and Table 6. Column (3)
shows that perceptions of a competitive work environment are positively asso-
ciated with showing social disapproval but the rather large marginal eﬀect is
not signiﬁcant (p=0.15). However, when we break the indicator into its compo-
nents, consider others as family or friends in column (4) we see the same sort of
compression of the job category marginal eﬀects as we saw in the contribution
data. In fact, in column (4) all four job indicators are now signiﬁcant, as is the
"consider others as friends" indicator. In Table 6 we see that ﬁve of the six
χ2 statistics associated with column (4) are lower and the signiﬁcance of any
diﬀerence in the point estimates falls when we control for perceived competition
on-the-job.
6 Treatment Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Jobs
In section 4 we made a case for why we don’t expect that our main results
can be explained by the diﬀerential selection of competitive personality types
into some jobs. Not only are there strong institutional reasons why diﬀerential
selection is not likely, we also control, to some extent, for personality diﬀerences
in our main regressions. Putting selection aside, it might still be interesting
to assess whether there are any treatment eﬀects of the diﬀerent job types and
their incentives on the social preferences of our participants. Luckily, we also
collected experience data from our participants that allows us to conduct a very
straight-forward treatment analysis. In column (4) of Table 2 we report one
ﬁnal contribution regression in which we add years of participant experience and
interactions of experience with the diﬀerent job categories.15 The interpretation
o ft h es t a n d - a l o n ee x p e r i e n c ec o e ﬃ c i e n ti st h ee ﬀ e c to fm o r ee x p e r i e n c ei no u r
control group (the students) on contributions. As one can see, the students tend
to become more cooperative with experience (p<0.10).
For our purposes, the interaction terms are more interesting. Compared to
the student baseline, each of our job categories experience signiﬁcant declines
in cooperativeness with experience. In addition some of the diﬀerences in these
treatment eﬀects make sense. The nonpoolers are subject to signiﬁcantly greater
reductions in cooperativeness than the poolers and staﬀ members (p<0.01 and
p<0.05, respectively). In fact, combining the baseline and diﬀerential eﬀects
suggest that, while students become more cooperative with experience in their
environment and poolers, traders, and staﬀ members show, more or less, stable
social preferences, the stock of nonpooler cooperativeness declines with experi-
ence.
15We had to drop age from the anlaysis because it is highly correlated (ρ =0 .77)w i t h
experience.
13We also report job category marginal eﬀects after accounting for the diﬀer-
ential impact of experience in parentheses in column (4) of Table 2. As one
can see, accounting for the treatment eﬀect of the incentives inherent in these
jobs further reduces the diﬀerences in the job category point estimates. We
take this as further evidence that competition on-the-job aﬀects worker social
preferences. Our analysis suggests the just three things: the combination of our
controls for personality, the competitive perceptions of our participants, and the
diﬀerential treatment eﬀect of experience on the job almost completely explain
the large diﬀerences in cooperation that we saw at the outset of our analysis.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our ﬁeld experiment with workers from the ﬁshing community of Toyama Bay
provides evidence supporting a standard prediction of tournament theory and
the theory of on-the-job competition more generally. Material incentives that
promote competition on the job and the resulting perceptions of competition
held by workers are associated with lower levels of cooperation between workers.
Putting this result in context, the extent to which this link between competition
and cooperation is important will obviously vary with the importance of team
production because managers will face only small tradeoﬀs between more intense
individual eﬀort and lower synergistic eﬀects when tournaments are set up under
a piece rate system, for example. However, when team production is essential,
promoting competition among workers may be counterproductive. Indeed, in
related work (Carpenter and Seki, 2004) where we limit attention to the ﬁshing
members of this community for which we have productivity data, we ﬁnd that
the return to social preferences for cooperation are quite high in an environment
where team production is important.
8 Appendix — Experiment Instructions (Back-
translation from Japanese)
Thank you very much for participating in the exercise today. You will be asked
to repeat the exercise 10 times. After that we request that you respond to a
brief questionnaire.
In the experiment, you will earn money. The amount you will earn depends
on the decisions you and everyone else make during the exercises. This experi-
ment aims to study individual behavior when money is at stake, thus we will use
real money during the exercises. You will win the money that you earn during
the experiment.
Any decisions you make in the exercises or responses you give in the ques-
tionnaire will be strictly conﬁdential. We will never tell anyone your responses
or choices. To assure your responses are conﬁdential, we ask you to not speak
to each other until the entire experiment is completed.
Rules of the exercise:
14Please check to make sure that the following items are in front of you: A
pencil, instructions (this paper), and a large brown envelop.
The exercise will be repeated 10 times but a new rule will be applied for the
last 5 times. We will explain new rule before the 6th round.
You are a member of a group of four people: there are three other people
in the group with you. You will all stay in the same group for each of the 10
periods.
To understand the exercise, imagine yourself in a situation where you have
to decide how to allocate resources intended for ﬁshing. You may allocate your
money to buy new ﬁshing equipment or to build a lighthouse. If you buy new
equipment, you will be able to increase your catch and income. If a lighthouse
is built, it will help increase the catch and income of all ﬁshers regardless of
whether they allocate money for building the lighthouse or not.
In the exercise, you will be asked to decide how much of your money to keep
and how much to allocate towards a group project.
At the beginning of each round, we will give you a white envelope with ten 50
yen coins inside. Each person in the group will then decide privately how many
of these 10 coins to allocate to a group project and how many to keep for himself
or herself. Everyone in the group beneﬁts equally from the money allocated to
the group project, but only you beneﬁt from the money you keep. Please put
the money you would like to keep in the brown envelop and return the rest that
you would like to allocate to the group project in the white envelop. We will
collect the white envelope. Please keep the brown envelop with you during the
experiment.
When all four members of the group have decided how many coins to allocate
to the group project, we will add up all the money from the four group members.
When we know the total, we will double it. Each person will then receive an
equal share of the doubled amount. Each person also keeps what ever money
he or she put in the large brown envelope.
Here is an example to illustrate how the experiment works. Each person
decides how much to allocate to the group project privately, so you will not
know what anyone else has decided when you make your choice. Suppose that
in the ﬁrst round everyone in your group, including yourself, allocate all 10 coins
to the group project. In total there are 10+10+10+10=40 coins in the group
project. The group project will double this amount which makes the total 80
coins. Each of you then receives an equal share, i.e., 20 coins.
To continue the example, let us now suppose in the second round. Everyone
in the group receives another 10 coins at the beginning of the round. Imagine
that this time everyone in the group contributes no money to the group project.
In total there are 0+0+0+0=0 coin in the group project. Because nobody con-
tributes to the group project, nobody receives anything from the group project.
Each person’s earnings for round two are just the 10 coins that each person
kept.
Let’s continue the example for one more round. Now say that you allocate
nothing to the group project and the other three people in the same group
allocate everything to the group project. The group project will receive a total
15of 0+10+10+10=30 coins. We double this amount which makes the total of 60
coins. Each person receives an equal share of the 60 coins, i.e., 15 coins from
the group project.
In the round 3 you would earn total of 25 coins (15 from the group project
plus the 10 you kept), while the other members will earn 15 coins from the
project.
A f t e re a c hr o u n d ,y o uw i l lb ep r o v i d e dw i t ha na l l o c a t i o nr e p o r tt h a tc o n -
tains all four members’ allocation to the group project in an random order,
total number of coins allocated to the project, and your share of income from
the group project. Please note that group members’ allocations are written in a
random order so that it is impossible to identify who allocate how much money
to the project.
The above is only an example. You will play 5 rounds and each of you
will decide, on your own, how to allocate the 10 coins that you receive at the
beginning of each round.
Are there any questions about how the experiment will proceed?
Rules for exercise 2 (only to be handed out after exercise 1 has been
completed)
Exercise 2 is very similar to exercise 1, but there will be one diﬀerence in
the procedures.
The ﬁrst part of each decision making round will be exactly the same as
exercise 1. There will be 5 decision making rounds and you will each receive
10 coins at the beginning of each round. You will decide privately how much
money to allocate to the group project and how much to keep. When everyone
in the group has made this decision, we will calculate the total contribution.
We will then double the total contribution. Each person will receive an equal
share of the doubled amount.
T h eo n l yd i ﬀ e r e n c eb e t w e e ne x e r c i s e1a n de x e r c i s e2i sy o uw i l lh a v et h e
possibility to send a message to the rest of your group. This is the message you
can send:
show “unhappy face”
You will be asked to ﬁll out an order form for an “unhappy face” after each
round. We will collect the order forms and count the number of “unhappy face”
marks ordered in each group. At the beginning of the next round, the white
envelop that you receive will have the number of unhappy face marks ordered
by your group on it.
Please note that ordering the “unhappy mark” will cost you 10 yen. When
you see stamps on your envelop, you know that some of the group members
have spent 10 yen each to tell the rest of the group that they are unhappy with
the amount that was allocated to the group project by the group. Anyone who
decides to send this message will do so anonymously. Nobody will know who
sent the messages.
Are there any questions about how the exercise will proceed?
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Figure 3: Time Series on the Probability of Social Disapproval (controlling for
how much the other group members contributed).
Students Nonpoolers Poolers Traders Staff Overall
P a r t i c i p a n t s 2 61 31 41 21 27 7
Female (fraction) 0.35 0.38 0 0.08 0.25 0.23
Age (mean) 21.35 53.54 49.78 35.00 34.16 36.08
High ( or Occupational) School (fraction) 0 0.46 0.46 0.58 0.67 0.36
Rotter Score (mean) 0.61 -0.23 0.78 -0.75 0.33 0.25
Cooperation Scale (mean) 0.38 0.50 1.07 0.25 0.25 0.47
TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS BY POPULATION
19(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonpoolers 2.06 1.99 2.41 14.35 (2.46)
[0.65]*** [1.04]** [0.98]** [4.57]***
Traders 2.99 2.84 3.10 11.71 (2.20)
[0.66]*** [0.85]*** [0.80]*** [4.50]***
Poolers 2.45 2.57 2.65 11.15 (1.64)
[0.62]*** [0.99]*** [0.93]*** [4.46]**
Staff 4.02 4.22 4.00 12.29 (2.96)
[0.66]*** [0.83]*** [0.78]*** [4.43]***
Disapproval Allowed -0.40 -0.40 0.03
[0.52] [0.52] [0.54]







High (or Occupational) School -0.67 -0.65 -0.49
[0.59] [0.55] [0.51]
Rotter Score -0.16 -0.23 -0.14
[0.10] [0.10]** [0.10]
Cooperation Scale 0.33 0.41 0.22
[0.21] [0.20]** [0.21]




Experience × Nonpooler -0.65
[0.30]**
Experience × Traders -0.52
[0.31]*
Experience × Poolers -0.52
[0.30]*
Experience × Staff -0.51
[0.30]*
Constant 2.49 0.53 -0.68 -5.74
[0.51]*** [1.71] [1.65] [4.44]
rho 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15
Round Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Obs. 770 760 760 670
Log Likelihood -1746 -1721 -1716 -1510
(dependent variable is Contributioni,t)
TABLE 2: CONTRIBUTION DECISIONS
Notes: Marginal effects from random effect Tobits reported. Numbers in parenthesis are 
job category marginal effects calculated at the mean amount of experience. * indicates 
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
20(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Contribution of Others -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Nonpoolers -0.43 -2.63 -2.87 -2.81
[0.49] [0.98]*** [1.01]*** [0.99]***
Traders -1.00 -2.55 -2.65 -2.57
[0.60]* [0.87]*** [0.87]*** [0.85]***
Poolers -1.28 -3.38 -3.43 -3.33
[0.56]** [0.98]*** [0.97]*** [0.95]***
Staff 0.15 -1.02 -1.03 -1.21
[0.57] [0.72] [0.72] [0.72]*
Female -0.30 -0.28 -0.17
[0.39] [0.39] [0.39]
Age 0.16 0.14 0.14
[0.08]** [0.08]* [0.08]*
Age
2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
High (or Occupational) School 0.14 0.14 0.07
[0.48] [0.48] [0.48]
Rotter Score -0.10 -0.07 -0.06
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Cooperation Scale 0.21 0.18 0.18
[0.17] [0.17] [0.16]
Competitive Work Environment 0.58
[0.41]
Consider Others Family 0.04
[0.63]
Consider Others Friends -0.73
[0.42]*
rho 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.49
Round Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Obs. 308 304 304 304
Log Likelihood -157 -151 -150 -149
(dependent variable is 1 if disapproval is shown by i in round t)
TABLE 3: SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL DECISIONS
Notes: Marginal effects from random effect probits reported. * indicates 
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
21Consider fellow workers as: Students Nonpoolers Traders Poolers Staff
Family 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.42
Friends 0.88 0.31 0.50 0.43 0.50
Strangers 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.08
Competitors 0.08 0.69 0.42 0.14 0.42
Level of Work Competition: High High Medium Low
TABLE 4: SURVEYED LEVELS OF INGROUP COMPETITION
(frequency categorizing others by population)
TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF CONTRIBUTION POINT ESTIMATES 















2=1.50 −  − 
Notes: First value is based on regression (2) in Table 2. Second value is based on regression 
(3) in Table 2. * indicates significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
 
TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF DISAPPROVAL POINT ESTIMATES 















2=3.93** −  − 
Notes: First value is based on regression (2) in Table 3. Second value is based on regression 
(4) in Table 3. * indicates significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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